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We formulate a simple theoretical model of a banking industry that we use to identify and 
construct theory-based measures of systemic bank shocks (SBS). These measures differ from 
“banking crisis” (BC) indicators employed in many empirical studies, which are constructed 
using primarily information on government actions undertaken in response to bank distress. 
Using both country-level and firm-level samples, we show that SBS indicators consistently 
predict BC indicators, indicating that BC indicators actually measure lagged policy responses 
to systemic bank shocks. We then re-examine the impact of macroeconomic factors, bank 
market structure, deposit insurance, and external shocks on the probability of systemic bank 
shocks (SBS) and on “banking crisis” (BC) indicators. We find that the impact of these 
variables on the likelihood of a policy response to banking distress (as represented by BC 
indicators) is frequently quite different from that on the likelihood of a systemic bank shock 
(SBS). We argue that disentangling the effects of systemic bank shocks and policy responses 
is crucial in understanding the roots of banking crises. We believe that many findings of a 
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has spurred renewed interest in banking crises. 
Some have stressed the similarities across countries and historical episodes (e.g. Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008a, 2009), while others have emphasized differences, both historical (e.g. Bordo, 
2008) and as related to the specific mechanics of the shock triggering a crisis (e.g. Gorton, 
2008). As pointed out by Allen and Gale (2007), the empirical literature on banking crises 
has mainly focused on documenting empirical regularities. Yet, the definition of a banking 
crisis —what it is, when it occurs, and how long it lasts—has been only loosely related to 
theory. As a result, this literature offers many—often contrasting—findings, which vary 
considerably in terms of samples used, banking crisis definitions and relevant dating.     
This paper reexamines the empirical evidence on the determinants of banking crises. 
Our main contribution is to disentangle an adverse shock to the banking industry from the 
attendant restorative policy response. We demonstrate that disentangling these effects is 
crucial to understanding the determinants of banking crises   We derive measures of systemic 
bank shocks (SBS) using a simple model of a banking industry in which an adverse shock to 
the banking system, as well as a government response, are explicitly defined.  The main 
objective of the theoretical exercise is to obtain well-defined measures of an adverse shock to 
banking that can be obtained from available data.   
By contrast, a large portion of the empirical literature has employed “banking crisis” 
(BC) indicators based on dating schemes that identify: crisis beginning dates, ending dates, 
and indicate whether the crisis was “systemic” or not.  As documented in Boyd, De Nicolò 
and Loukoianova (2009) (hereafter BDNL), these schemes do not rely on any theory to 
identify accounting or market measures that capture the realization of systemic bank shocks.    3  
 
Rather, in virtually all cases what is measured is a government response to a perceived 
crisis—not the onset or duration of an adverse shock.   
It is important to note that this literature has interpreted an SBS event and a BC event 
as one and the same.  There are two fundamental problems with that approach.  First, the two 
events actually tend to occur on different dates. Second, one event is bad for the industry (an 
SBS shock), while the other may be good for it (a BC shock). Thus, as stressed in De Nicolò 
et al (2004), a researcher using these BC indicators will be unable to disentangle the effects 
of an adverse shock to the banking industry and the effects of a restorative policy response.   
A.   The Data  
 
We use two large samples: a country-level dataset and a firm-level dataset.  While the 
use of country-level data is standard in the literature, employing individual bank data is 
novel.  It allows us to significantly extend the empirical analysis in two ways. First, as will be 
explained, with the individual bank dataset we can obtain better SBS indicators.  Second, the 
impact of systemic bank shocks and policy responses can be gauged taking into account the 
differential impact of these shocks on each bank in a country. Tests on this sample are more 
powerful, as we use random effect Logit regressions that exploit more fully the information 
contained in banks’ heterogeneity.  
The explanatory variables that we study are ones that the existing literature has 
identified as important determinants of the probability that a country will experience a 
banking crisis.  These include the bank market structure, presence or lack of deposit 
insurance, and the occurrence of an external shock, (e.g. a currency crisis)
1. We find that 
                                                 
1 This is a very large literature and it is impossible to review all or even the majority of related articles. We 
have selectively chosen a few studies, but the issues we raise would be relevant to much work besides these 
studies.      4  
 
these explanatory variables generally have different effects on the probability of an adverse 
bank shock (SBS indicators) and on the probability of a government intervention (BC 
indicators). As we will make clear, this has led to confusion in the interpretation of empirical 
results and, we shall argue, to unwarranted policy conclusions. 
B.   Findings 
We obtain five key findings:   
1.  There are significant discrepancies among BC indicators (we study four of these) in their 
dating of the beginnings and durations of banking crises. Thus, there is considerable 
disagreement among researchers in dating the same modern episodes of financial distress.  
2.  Our SBS indicators consistently and robustly predict all four BC indicators. This suggests 
that BC indicators represent lagged government responses to adverse banking shocks.  
This interpretation is further supported by our investigation of the criteria used in 
constructing the BC measures (BDNL).  Almost without exception, researchers obtain 
their information from government sources.  Just as importantly, their definitions of what 
constitutes a banking crisis typically depend on government actions such as liquidity 
provision, bank resolution mechanisms, and so on. 
3.  More concentrated banking systems significantly increase the probability of a systemic 
bank shock (SBS). As will be discussed, this finding is totally at odds with what has been 
reported elsewhere in the literature.   
4.  The probability of a banking crisis arrival (SBS indicators) is unaffected by the presence 
or lack of a formal deposit insurance system. This finding is in marked contrast with 
previous research that has concluded that the presence of deposit insurance results in    5  
 
greater moral hazard and riskier banking systems.  Previous research, however, has 
employed BC indicators as measures of banking crisis arrival.   When one separately 
employs SBS and BC indicators the interpretation of empirical results is totally different.   
5.  The occurrence of currency crises increases both the probability of a systemic bank shock 
(SBS) and of a government response to bank distress (BC). However, while financial 
openness and the flexibility of exchange rate arrangements may affect the probability of 
government (BC) response, only the latter variable has a significant negative impact on 
the probability of a systemic bank shock (SBS).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents a theoretical model in 
which banking problems are produced by the arrival of exogenous shocks to the industry.  
Section III presents BC indicators based on four major crisis classifications that have been 
employed extensively in the literature. In Section IV we employ a large country-level panel 
dataset similar to those employed by others in this literature, and show that our SBS 
indicators consistently and robustly predict the BC indicators. Furthermore, we assess the 
impact of bank concentration, deposit insurance, and external shocks on the probability of a 
systemic bank shock (SBS) and, separately, on the probability of a government response to 
bank distress (BC). In section V we carry out a similar empirical analysis using the firm-level 
dataset.  Section VI concludes.   
 
 
    6  
 
II.   A SIMPLE BANKING MODEL 
In this section we present a simple model of a banking industry and a government 
deposit insurer, and use its comparative statics to identify measures of systemic bank 
shocks.
2 The banks in the model are Cournot-Nash competitors that raise insured deposits, 
make risky loans, and hold risk free government bonds.  The deposit insurer bails out the 
banks when they fail. Thus, the economy is composed of a “government” and three classes of 
agents: entrepreneurs, depositors, and banks. All agents are risk-neutral, and time is discrete. 
 
Entrepreneurs 
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by their reservation income 
levels [0,1] a , which is distributed uniformly on the unit interval.  Entrepreneurs have no 
initial resources but have access to identical risky projects that require a fixed amount of date 
t investment, standardized to 1, and yield a random output at date  1 t  . Specifically, at date 
t the investment in a project yields Y  with probability 1 (0,1) t P  , and 0 otherwise. The 
probability of success  1 t P  is a random variable independent across entrepreneurs. Its 
realization is observed by them at date 1 t  . Hence, entrepreneurs make their date t decisions 
on the basis of their conditional expectations of  1 t P , denoted by  1 tt EP  .  
                                                 
2 The shocks we model are exogenous to the banking industry and may, but need not, be exogenous to the 
economy.  This will become clear when the analysis proceeds.   
    7  
 
Entrepreneurs are financed by banks with simple debt contracts. The contract pays the 
bank a loan interest rate 
L R  if the project is successful.  Thus, an entrepreneur with 
reservation income level a will undertake the project if  
                           1()
L
tt E PYR a    .                                          (1) 
Let 







t X Fa fad a   , where  (.) f  is the density of the uniform distribution 
function.  This defines implicitly the inverse loan demand function:  
                           
1
11 (, ) ( )
L
tt t t t t R XE P Y E P X

                                  (2) 
Bonds 
 
One-period bonds are supplied by the government in amounts specified below. For 
simplicity, we assume that only banks can invest in bonds.
3 A bond purchased at date t 
yields a gross interest rate  t r  at date  1 t  .  
Depositors 
Depositors invest all their funds in a bank at date t to receive interest plus principal at 
date  1 t  . Deposits are fully insured, so that the total supply of deposits does not depend on 
risk, and is represented by the upward sloping inverse supply curve 
D
tt t R ZZ   , where  t Z  
                                                 
3 If we assume that deposits provide valued services to depositors besides the interest they pay, then they may 
be held even if they have a rate or return dominated by bonds.  For present purposes, modeling all this is a 
needless complication.       8  
 
denotes total deposits. The slope of this function is a random variable, to be described below, 
whose realization is observed at date t. 
Banks 
Banks collect insured deposits, and pay a flat rate insurance premium standardized to 
zero. On the asset side, banks choose the total amount of lending and the amount of bonds.   
In both loan and deposit markets banks are symmetric Cournot-Nash competitors.  Banks are 
perfectly diversified in the sense that for any positive measure of entrepreneurs financed, 
1 (0,1) t P  , is also the fraction of borrowers whose project turns out to be successful at date 
1 t  .  Banks observe the realization of  1 t P  at date  1 t  . Hence, as for the entrepreneurs, 
banks make their date t decisions on the basis of their conditional expectations 1 tt EP  .  
Government 
The government supplies a fixed amount of bonds to the market, denoted byB . The 
government also guarantees deposits. It will intervene whenever bank deposits payments 
cannot be honored in part or in full. When this occurs, the government will pay depositors all 
the claims unsatisfied by banks and all banks will be bailed out. These payments will be 
financed by issuing additional bonds, which will be purchased by banks which collect new 
deposits at date tl  , where  1 l  .
4  
                                                 
4 In this very simple set-up, banks are identical and exposed to the same risks. Thus, if one bank fails, all banks 
fail. This causes the logical problem that, in bankruptcy states, government bonds must be sold to failed banks.  
A more realistic assumption would be that some banks fail and some do not. It would be relatively easy to 
augment the current model with this feature, for example, by assuming that the shock to the loan portfolio 
involves not all banks but just a fraction of them. For our purposes, however, this is not essential, since the 
comparative statics on which our systemic bank shock indicators are based would be essentially the same.    9  
 
The realization of a systemic banking shock occurs at date  1 t   and, by definition, 
occurs when the banking system’s profits are negative. The government’s response to such a 
shock will be triggered when the government is able to ascertain that the banking system has 
become insolvent. If the government observes date  1 t   bank profits with a lag, then  1 l  .  
Sequence of events  
Suppose that in period t  realized bank profits are non-negative. Banks collect 
deposits, entrepreneurs demand, and banks supply funds based on 1 tt EP  . Deposits, bank 
loans, and investment in bonds are determined for period t. In period 1 t  ,  1 t P  is realized and 
observed by entrepreneurs and banks. Borrowers pay loans and in turn, banks pay depositors, 
if possible.  If bank profits are non-negative, depositors are paid in full. If profits are 
negative, depositors cannot be paid in full, and by definition, this is a systemic bank shock. 
Depositors are paid pro-rata by the banks. The government responds to the crisis at tl   by 
issuing bonds and paying depositors any claim unsatisfied by banks. 
 
Equilibrium  
  We describe the equilibrium at date t by dropping time subscripts from all variables, 
and define 1 tt p EP   .  
 
The bank problem 
Let  i D  denote total deposits of bank i,   
1
N
i i Z D
  denote total deposits, and 
ij ji DD     denote the sum of deposits chosen by all banks except bank i. Let    10  
 
ij ji LL     denote the sum of loans chosen by all banks except bank i. Each bank chooses 
deposits, loans, and bond holdings b  so as to maximize expected profits, given the choices of 
other banks.  Thus, a bank chooses  
3 ,, L bD R    to maximize: 
                                                            (, ) ( )
L
iD i pRL L p Lr bRD D D          (3) 
subject to                                          LbD   .                                                    (4)   
 
The government’s policy function 
  Let   (.) t   denote current realized aggregate profits. A government intervention is 
described by the indicator function:   ( )
G
tt l I    = 1 if   0 tl    , and 0 otherwise. The 
government supplies bonds in the amount ()
S
tt t l BB B   , where  () ()
G
tt l t t lt l BI     .    
Given  p , an equilibrium is a total amount of loans  X , total bonds B , total deposits 
Z , bond interest rates, loan rates, deposit rates, and government responses such that:  a) the 
banking industry is in a symmetric Nash equilibrium; b) the bond market is in equilibrium;  
and c) the government meets its commitment to deposit insurance.    11  
 
Comparative statics  
  We illustrate the comparative statics of the model using a simple linear specification: 
the loan supply is given by 
1 (,)
L R Xp Y pX
  , and the demand for deposits is given by 
()
D R ZZ   .
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The following table summarizes changes in the endogenous variables in response to 
an adverse shock.   
                                                                  Adverse shocks 
                                                        p decreases           increases      Y decreases         
Endogenous variables 
Total Loans                                                                                                                          
Total Deposits                                                                                                             
Bond interest rate                                                                                                            
Loan rate                                                                                                                     
Deposit rate                                                                                                                                               
Realized profits                                                                                                      
 
We can see from this table that a systemic bank shock can be triggered by shocks to 
the technology ( p and Y );  to  preferences or wealth ( ); to a decline in firms’ probability 
                                                 
5 These comparative statics properties hold much more generally.  We employ the linear case so that there is no 
need to discuss a number of technical conditions.      12  
 
of a good outcome (a decline in  p ); to a decline in firms’ demand for loans due to a decline 
in  Y ; or, finally, to a decline in consumers’ demand for deposits, represented by a decline in 
 . Note that these properties hold under any market structure, that is, for any value of N. 
Such adverse shocks are for the most part unobservable, but their occurrence results 
in predictable changes in certain variables that are observable.  In particular, independently of 
the source of the shock, aggregate loans and deposits will decline, loan rates will increase, 
and profits will decline.  By contrast, the deposit rate and the bond rate will move in a 
different direction depending on the source of the shock.  
Thus, the model allows us to identify a systemic bank shock with a severe decline in 
loans, deposits, and bank profits, or an increase in loan rates. In our empirical investigation 
we will use these properties of the model to create empirical measures of systematic banking 
shocks (SBS) that can be constructed with the two different samples.  
We next turn to the banking crisis (BC) indicators.    
 
III.   “BANKING CRISIS”   INDICATORS AND THEIR DISCREPANCIES 
A variety of classifications of systemic banking crises have been used since the mid-
1990s by many researchers. Here we consider four comprehensive classifications well known 
in the literature and widely used in empirical work. These four classifications are all updates, 
modifications and/or expansions of the classification of banking crises first compiled by 
Caprio and Kinglebiel (CK) (1996, 1999).   
The first classification is due to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002, 2005, 
hereafter DD), and appears to be the first to have introduced an explicit definition of a 
systemic banking crisis.  The second classification is that compiled by Caprio et al. (2005)    13  
 
(CEA henceforth). CEA updated and extended the earlier CK classification. The third 
classification is one recently compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) (RR henceforth). The 
classification criteria used in RR are essentially those used in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
whose classification was, in turn, based on CK’s classification. Finally, the fourth 
classification is one recently constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2008) (LV henceforth), 
which extends previous classifications both in time and country coverage. This classification 
seems to be considered the most complete to date, and has been used in recent empirical 
work (see e.g. Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper, 2009). 
 
A.   The Crisis Dating Schemes Rely on Government Data Sources and Define Crises in 
Terms of Government Actions  
 
In BDNL we carry out a detailed review of the criteria used to identify banking crisis 
dates and duration. That review demonstrates that crisis dating in all these classifications 
depends on information obtained from bank regulators and/or central banks, and what is 
recorded is government responses to perceived crises. If such interventions were 
contemporaneous to systemic bank shocks, they could serve as reasonable proxies of these 
shocks.  However, as we show below, these measures of policy responses are not 
contemporaneous to the realization of SBS shocks.  
Next, we consider the four series of binary BC indicators that will be used in our 
empirical work. Each of the four binary BC indicators is set to 1 if a country-year is 
classified as a crisis year and 0 otherwise. Further, we consider two versions of each 
indicator. The first excludes all country-years classified as crisis after the first crisis year. In 
practice, this kind of indicator identifies crises’ starting dates. These starting dates have been    14  
 
used extensively in event-type analyses since IMF (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). The second version includes all crisis country-years beginning with the starting date.   
Differing from DD and CEA, the RR and LV classifications do not report crisis 
durations. For these classifications we have used the duration and country years of the CEA 
classification, or the DD duration when the CEA duration was not available. In this way, we 
preserve the starting dates of the original classifications, but we augment them with the 
applicable duration of either the CEA or DD classifications.
6   
Table 1 reports statistics (Panel A), and pair-wise comparisons of crisis dating  (Panel 
B) across classifications. The most striking fact is that for many crisis episodes the dating 
classifications differ considerably both in terms of starting date and duration.  For example, 
15 country years are classified as first crisis years by RR but not by DD, while the reverse is 
true for 30 country years (Panel B, second line).  Panel B shows the ratio of total crisis 
ranking discrepancies divided by total crisis rankings.  For first crisis years, this varies 
between 23.0% and 49.5%.  For the full set of crisis years it varies between 24.5% and 
43.4%.  In other words, in terms of dating crises (which is the heart of the matter), the 
different methods are in disagreement roughly between a quarter and a half of the time. All 
four classifications only agree on 41 start dates.
7   
These widespread discrepancies across banking crisis classifications indicate that 
there is disagreement among researchers in dating the same modern episodes of financial 
stress. This makes the robustness of many results obtained in a large empirical literature 
                                                 
6 Thus, for two of the four series we have done some between-study data splicing.  However, that does not 
occur when we use the start date only versions of each study. All our important findings hold qualitatively for 
both methods of dating banking crises.      
7  Some discrepancies for specific countries have been previously noted by Rancière, Tornell and Westermann 
(2008) and Von Hagen and Ho (2007).      15  
 
problematic. When we turn to our empirical analysis with the four BC indicators, it is not 
surprising that they often produce different results. These discrepancies compel us to use all 
four of them in our empirical analysis.  
 
IV.   EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  
We begin our empirical investigation using a country-level dataset that merges and 
updates the large annual cross-country panel dataset used extensively in DD (2005) and Beck 
et al. (2006), with data for up to 91 countries for the 1980-2002 period.  
We proceed in three steps. First, we describe the benchmark specification of Logit 
regressions with BC indicators as dependent variables. Second, we construct our theory-
based indicators of systemic bank shocks (SBS indicators) for this sample and include lagged 
SBS indicators as additional explanatory variables. This gives an assessment of the extent to 
which SBS indicators predict BC indicators. Third, we re-examine the evidence on the 
impact of bank market structure, deposit insurance and external shocks on banking fragility, 
estimating Logit regressions separately with BC and SBS indicators as dependent variables.   
 
A.   Benchmark Logit Regressions    
In our benchmark Logit regressions, we use the following set of explanatory variables 
employed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Beck et al (2006):  measures of the 
macroeconomic environment (real GDP growth, the real interest rate, inflation, changes in 
the terms of trade, and exchange rate depreciation);  a measure of potential vulnerability of a 
country to a run on its currency (the ratio of M2 to international reserves); a measure of  
economic development  (real GDP per capita); and a measure of financial system    16  
 
development (bank credit to private sector GDP). Finally, we include real bank credit growth 
lagged twice which has been employed as a proxy measure for credit booms.   
Versions of the four BC indicators that exclude all crisis years except the first have 
been sometimes used as dependent variables in this literature.
8  We will not follow this 
practice here, since excluding crisis years after the first one seems unwarranted for at least 
two reasons. First, as we have shown in section II, the BC classifications actually index a 
variety of government measures to address banking distress. Therefore, deleting observations 
of years during which a government implements measures in response to continued banking 
distress significantly reduces the informational content. Second, excluding these observations 
requires taking a stand on the duration of a crisis. As documented in Table 1 of section III, 
excluded observations account for a sizeable portion of the sample, ranging from 10 to 15 
percent of available country years, inducing sample biases that is difficult to control. As 
pointed out by Boyd et al. (2005), this procedure can be particularly troublesome for 
countries where multiple crises have occurred. For these reasons, the empirical analysis in 
this study uses BC indicators that include all crisis-years observations.
9  
                                                 
8 This exclusion has been made on the ground that “the behavior of some of the explanatory variables is likely 
to be affected by the crisis itself, and this could cause problems for the estimation” (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002, p.1381). 
9 However, in BDNL (Table 2) we report results using the version of the four BC indicators that excludes all 
crisis years except the first. We also employed two different samples to account for differences in results due to 
either country or crisis coverage. We found that real GDP growth and real interest rates are the only variables 
that enter significantly (negatively and positively respectively) in all regressions. For all other explanatory 
variables, there is at least one specification that yields results different from all the others. These differences in 
results occur not only between specifications within the same sample, but also comparing results of the same 
regressions between samples.  
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B.   Measures of Systemic Bank Shocks  
Our choice of SBS indicators is dictated by data availability. Aggregate bank profits 
are unavailable in this dataset. Country-average bank loan rates are available in some 
countries but not in others, and are not consistently measured cross-sectionally.  This leaves 
us with changes in loans and deposits, which were derived theoretically as unambiguous 
indicators and which are available for almost all nations.   
We construct two types of SBS indicators, one based on aggregate bank loans and the 
other based on aggregate bank deposits. For loans, we construct two indicator variables, 
SBSL25 and SBSL10, which represent sharp decreases in loan growth.  They are equal to 
one if real domestic lending growth is lower than the 25% and 10%-percentile of the entire 
distribution of real domestic bank credit growth across countries respectively. The second 
indicators represent sharp decreases in total bank deposits as a fraction of GDP.   
Analogously, we construct two indicator variables, SBSD25 and SBSD10, equal to one if the 
growth rate of the deposit-to-GDP ratio is lower than the 25% and 10% percentile of its 
distribution across countries respectively.
10    
 
C.   SBS indicators predict BC indicators  
If BC indicators are contemporaneous to systemic bank shock realizations, then SBS 
indicators should not predict BC indicators. As shown in Table 2, however, they do.  In 
regressions 1-4, lagged SBS lending indicators predict all BC indicators and this is true using 
both the 10
th percentile cut-off and the 25
th percentile cut-off.  As shown in regressions 5-8, 
however, while SBS lagged deposit indicators are always positively associated with BC 
                                                 
10 Our choice of indicator thresholds is also dictated by data availability.  We cannot set the thresholds for each 
country individually, since the time dimension of the sample is not long enough to do that in a meaningful way.       18  
 
indicators, the relevant coefficients are (weakly) significant in only two specifications.  This 
suggests that depositors may react to a systemic bank shock with a lag due to information 
asymmetries, or might not react at all if guarantees on deposits are in place.  The idea of a 
lagged depositor response is also supported by our finding, reported in BDNL (table 6), that 
SBS lending indicators predict SBS deposit indicators.  
In sum, BC indicators systematically record systemic bank shocks with a lag. 
Arguably, this is because these indicators index the (lagged) start and duration of policy 
responses to banking distress. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact discussed earlier— 
that the BC indicator definitions are based almost exclusively on government sources and 
defined in terms of government actions. We believe that SBS and BC indicators measure 
different things: a systemic bank shock (SBS indicators) and government responses to bank 
distress (BC indicators). The economic importance of these differences is illustrated next.
11    
 
D.   Bank Market Structure  
In an extensive set of Logit regressions using the DD crisis classification, Beck et al. 
(2006) conclude that banking crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems.  
Table 3 reports the results of our baseline Logit specifications with BC and SBS indicators as 
dependent variables, where we have added a bank concentration measure identical to the one 
used by Beck et.al (2006).  This is denoted by avgherf, which is an inter-temporal average of 
the Hirschman-Herfindhal index for each country.   
Regressions 1-4 indicate that there is no evidence of a significant relationship 
between bank concentration and the probability of a government response to banking distress 
                                                 
11  It is interesting to observe in Table 2 that very few of the right-hand side control variables are statistically 
significant and consistent across the different dependent variables.  The only control variable that is significant 
in all specifications is rgrpgr, which is the growth rate in real GDP.       19  
 
as represented by these BC indicators.
 12   Thus, the Beck et al (2006) result is clearly not 
robust. It depends on the definition of a BC event, sample composition, the choice of control 
variables, or some combination of these factors.
13   By contrast, in all specifications with the 
SBS indicators as dependent variables (regressions 5-8), systemic bank shocks are more 
likely to occur in more concentrated banking systems.  These findings with SBS indicators 
dependent are consistent with some earlier theory work by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) and 
De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009) and empirical results reported in Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal 
(2006 and 2009) and De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007).      
  
E.   Deposit Insurance 
In Logit regressions of the type illustrated so far, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) find—and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004, 2006) and  Beck et al. (2006) confirm—
that banking crises are more likely in countries with deposit insurance systems in place. 
These findings have been interpreted as consistent with the moral hazard incentives created 
by deposit insurance and other government guarantees.
14 Table 4 reports the results of Logit 
regressions with the BC and SBS indicators as dependant variables, in which we retain the 
                                                 
12 Our baseline specification differs slightly from the one used by Beck et al (2006). However, we have been 
able to essentially replicate their results using their identical specification and sample.  Moreover, in BDNL 
(Table 7) we present Logit regressions with the average C3 concentration ratio as an alternative measure of 
bank concentration, obtaining identical results   
13 In tests to be presented later (Table 7) we employ an individual bank dataset that we shall argue is more 
powerful than the country panel dataset.  With those data, for all four BC indicators we find a positive and 
significant relationship between banking concentration and the probability of a BC event.  Thus, with the 
arguably better data, we find the opposite relationship as that reported by Beck et al. (2006). We believe this is 
simply due to a lack of robustness in their original findings.     
14 Yet, this argument is valid only in a partial equilibrium context and absent sufficiently strong countervailing 
regulations limiting banks’ risk-taking, such as capital requirements. In a general equilibrium context, and 
allowing contracts in nominal terms because of a non-trivial role for money, this simple moral hazard argument 
does not necessarily hold (e.g. Boyd, Chang and Smith 2002 and 2004).    
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Herfindhal index as a control and add the indicator variable di. The variable di takes on the 
value 1 if a government deposit insurance system is in place, and zero otherwise.  This 
variable is obtained from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).  
As shown in regressions 1-4, in three of four specifications there is evidence of a 
positive and significant relationship between the BC indicators and the deposit insurance 
variable.  However, if we interpret the BC indicators as government policy response 
indicators, this finding seems hardly surprising.  It simply suggests that policy responses to 
systemic bank shocks are more likely if a deposit insurance system is in place.  And with this 
interpretation, this empirical finding sheds little light on the moral hazard effects of deposit 
insurance.  Results are different when we use SBS indicators as dependent variables. As 
shown in regressions 5-8, in none of the specifications does the probability of a systemic 
bank shock significantly depend on the presence of a deposit insurance system
15 . In sum, our 
results suggest that the presence of deposit insurance has no effect on the probability of a 
systemic bank shock.  However, they suggest that deposit insurance makes a government 
response to systemic bank shocks more likely, a finding that seems hardly remarkable.   
    
F.   Currency Crises, Financial Openness and Exchange Rate Arrangements  
There is a substantial literature on external shocks to an economy and their effects on 
the incidence of banking crises. But, empirical results often diverge in important dimensions.  
In a seminal empirical study on the subject, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that the 
                                                 
15 To explore this issue further, in BDNL (Table 10) we report Logit regressions where we have added an index 
of  “moral hazard” associated with design features of deposit insurance systems (used in  Beck et al (2006)). In 
those tests we find no evidence that more generous deposit insurance systems result in a higher probability of a 
banking crisis (SBS indicator).   
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occurrence of a banking crisis is a predictor for the occurrence of a currency crisis, and that 
indicators of real activity predict the occurrence of both kinds of crises. Yet, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2005) observed that Kaminsky and Reihnart’s study was based on a 
relatively small sample of 20 countries, that they investigated mostly fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, and that the impact of several potential determinants of crises was not 
examined jointly.  
Specifically, two factors have been pointed out in the literature as potential sources of 
banking system fragility: financial openness and exchange rate rigidity. Many have argued 
that financial openness, in exposing countries to volatile capital flows, may make domestic 
banking systems more vulnerable to runs. However, in their extensive survey of the 
literature, Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) conclude that “there is little formal 
empirical evidence to support the oft-cited claim that financial globalization in and of itself is 
responsible for the spate of financial crises that the world has seen over the last three 
decades” (op. cit., 2009, p.28).  In light of the recent financial crisis, a debate on the potential 
value of limiting financial openness (see e.g. Ostry et al, 2010) is back in the headlines.  
The lack of sufficient exchange rate flexibility has also been pointed out as a potential 
source of bank instability, as it might give incentives to banks to take on currency 
mismatches that can endanger their solvency. In examining the impact of “external” shocks 
on banking crises, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and Arteta and Eichengreeen (2002) found 
that exchange rate arrangements do not appear to have a significant impact on the likelihood 
of banking “crises”, as measured by BC indicators. By contrast, Domac and Martinez-Peira 
(2003) find that in developing economies, banking crises, as measured by BC indicators, are 
less likely in countries with fixed exchange rate systems.
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Here we re-examine the role of these “external” factors in determining the four 
measures of government responses to banking distress (BC) as well as of our two measures 
of systemic bank shocks (SBS).  Our focus is both on illustrating the differences in the results 
obtained with BC and SBS indicators, and on providing novel evidence on the relationship 
between external shocks and bank fragility.  
We refine the specification of the Logit regressions used in the previous sections, 
which was employed to facilitate comparison with the previously cited literature.  First, for 
present purposes we use lagged values of all explanatory variables. This specification is more 
satisfactory than using contemporaneous variables, since it delivers an interpretation of these 
regressions as “forecasting” equations, where both simultaneity biases and endogeneity 
issues are less relevant.  Second, we replace the measures of exchange rate depreciation 
(depr), of potential vulnerability of a country to a run of the currency (m2res), and of terms 
of trade shocks (totch), with a direct indicator of a currency crisis (crisis25). This indicator is 
constructed using monthly data employing the algorithm implemented in Frankel and Wei 
(2004).  It equals 1 if the sum of exchange rate depreciation and loss of international reserves 
is lower than the 25
th percentile of the entire cross country distribution.  
Financial openness and exchange rate flexibility are captured by two previously 
unexploited measures of bank fragility. The financial openness measure (finopen) is given by 
the sum of countries’ external assets and liabilities over GDP as estimated by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2005).  Exchange rate flexibility is measured by an index of the degree of 
flexibility of exchange rate arrangements (erclassrr) constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), which classifies their degree of flexibility in increasing order.      23  
 
Table 5 illustrates the new Logit regressions with BC and SBS indicators as 
dependent variables. Here, we have retained bank concentration and deposit insurance 
variables as controls. Note that with the new specification all results previously established 
for these variables (Table 4) continue to hold qualitatively. 
In the regressions with BC indicators as dependent variables (regressions 1-4), two 
results stand out. First, in all specifications BC indicators are positively associated with the 
occurrence of a currency crisis, and significantly so in three of four.  Thus, the government 
seems more likely to intervene in a banking crisis when it is preceded by a currency crisis. 
Second, financial openness (finopen)  and the flexibility of exchange rate arrangements 
(erclassrr) enter significantly in only one BC specification (column (1)).  Although these 
factors have been mentioned in the literature as important determinants of banking fragility, 
they do not appear to be significant determinants of policy (BC) responses.  
Quite different results are obtained with the SBS indicators as dependent variables 
(regressions 5-8). There is evidence that both financial openness (finopen), and the flexibility 
of exchange rate arrangements (erclassrr) increase the probability of a systemic bank shock, 
(although the relevant coefficients are not always statistically significant).   
In sum, in these tests there is a positive and significant impact of currency crises on 
both the probability of a government response, (BC), and on the probability of systemic bank 
shocks (SBS). However, financial openness and exchange rate arrangements appear to affect 
only the probability of a systemic bank shock, not the probability of a government response.  
These differences in findings are interesting and undoubtedly deserve more analysis in future    24  
 
research.  For present purposes, however, they primarily serve to emphasize the importance 
of separating the BC and SBS indicators, and correctly interpreting what they represent.
16    
 
V.   EVIDENCE FROM BANK-LEVEL DATA 
In this section we replicate the previous analysis using a bank level panel dataset. 
This analysis is not strictly comparable to any of the studies reviewed thus far.  We shall 
argue, however, that the cost of losing direct comparability is offset by the advantage of 
better measurement and more powerful tests.  In fact, the evidence obtained with this bank-
level dataset supports the main finding regarding the key differences between BC and SBS 
indicators. It also provides evidence that the use of bank-level data may be more informative 
in assessing the determinants of bank fragility.   
We use a bank-level dataset employed in Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2006, 2009) and 
De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007). These data include accounting information for about 
3,000 banks in a large sample of emerging and developing countries over the period 1993 to 
2004, which is from the Bankscope (Fitch-IBCA) database. Specifically, they include all 
commercial banks (unconsolidated accounts) for which data are available. The sample 
comprises all banks operating in each period, including those which exited either because 
they were absorbed by other banks or because they were closed.
17   
                                                 
16 Similar results emerge from the analysis of the impact of bank dollarization on bank fragility. De Nicolò, 
Honohan and Ize (2005) find that dollarization is positively associated with bank fragility using a theory-based 
indicator of systemic bank shock, the Z-score of large banks, as well as measures of aggregate non-performing 
loans. By contrast, Arteta (2003) finds no effects using a version of BC indicators. 
17 Coverage of the Bankscope database is incomplete in some countries for the earlier years (1993 and 1994), 
but from 1995 coverage in almost all countries is about 95 percent of all banking systems’ assets.     25  
 
Using a firm-level dataset has two key advantages.  First, it allows us to construct our 
theory-based SBS indicators based on severe declines in profits.  As noted earlier, using this 
direct measure of systemic bank shocks was not feasible with the country dataset. Second, 
individual bank data and the almost universal coverage of banks allow us to conduct more 
powerful tests.  Banking systems heterogeneity and, specifically, the fact that bank systemic 
shock may affect banks differently, are taken into account. This means that the data 
determine whether a bank shock is “systemic” in nature, or only affects a portion of the 
banking system; and similarly, whether government actions are truly responding to a 
systemic bank shock or only to distress affecting a portion of the banking system. In addition, 
we can construct better measures of some determinants of bank fragility such as bank market 
structure, since these variables can be constructed as time-series and not as period averages. 
As noted, the comparison with the previous work is not perfect, as the period covered 
by the bank-level dataset is shorter than the previous one, and includes only emerging and 
developing economies, whereas the country datasets also include advanced economies. Yet, a 
comparison of the qualitative results is still appropriate, as we retain about two thirds of the 
observations classified by BC indicators as “crisis” years for about 60 countries.    
 
A.   Measures of Systemic Bank Shocks and Government Responses 
As observed in Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2009), the best empirical measure of 
actual failure in banking is arguably a binary indicator indicating whether a sample bank 
“survived” or “failed.”  Unfortunately, such data are difficult to obtain since actual bank 
failures are uncommon occurrences and failing banks are often rescued by government.     26  
 
However, consistent with the implications of our model we can define two measures 
capturing extreme adverse realizations of bank profits. We construct two firm-level SBS 
indicators based on the overall distribution of the sum of profits and equity capital divided by 
assets: FAIL5 and FAIL10. These variables correspond to the 5
th and 10
th percentile of the 
entire distribution of this sum across time and countries. Thus, these measures can capture a 
systemic bank shock through a sharp drop in the sum of a bank’s profits plus capital.
18   
With the individual bank dataset, we must re-define the indicator of a government 
response to a systemic bank shock, e.g a BC indicator.  For this purpose we use the cross 
product of a country BC indicator, and a bank profit shock indicator.  For example, in Table 
6 “DD5” is defined as the product of the DD indicator for a country-year, and the 5
th 
percentile profit indicator for a bank-year.  Other variables are defined similarly.  These 
transformations yield modified BC indicators naturally interepreted as the joint occurrence 
that a bank is distressed and is in a country in which the government is responding to a 
banking crisis. The interpretation of an SBS indicator as a dependent variable is 
straightforward: it is the realization that a bank suffers an extremely bad profit outcome.      
To account for bank heterogeneity across countries, we estimate random coefficient 
Logit regressions. Standard likelihood ratio tests confirmed the superiority of this 
specification over a pooled specification, indicating the importance of taking bank 
heterogeneity into account. In the Logit regressions presented in Tables 6 and 7, all 
explanatory variables are lagged one period as in section IV.    
                                                 
18 Our theoretical model did not include banks’ equity capital.  However, for the empirical implementation we 
recognize that when the sum of profits plus equity becomes negative, a firm is “bankrupt.”      27  
 
Our baseline specification includes as controls standard macroeconomic variables 
available for all countries in the sample: GDP growth (growth), the inflation rate (infl), and 
GDP per capita (gdppc). In addition, we control for bank size with the log of assets (lasset).  
B.   SBS indicators predict BC indicators 
As shown in Table 6, in all specifications the SBS indicators predict the BC indicators with 
high significance, suggesting again that the BC indicators capture lagged government 
responses. GDP growth predicts BC indicators with significance levels much higher than 
those obtained with the country data. In addition, bank size has a positive and significant 
impact on the joint probability of a bank in distress being in a country with crisis 
intervention.  This could be the result of too-big-to-fail policies; that is, when large banks are 
failing the authorities are more likely to intervene.    
In sum, the ability of SBS indicators to predict BC indicators found in country data is 
even stronger when using bank-level data.  
 
C.   Bank Concentration, Deposit Insurance and External Shocks 
 
Mirroring what was done previously, the last set of regressions in Table 7 compares 
Logit estimates with BC and SBS indicators as dependent variables. We focus on the impact 
of:  i. bank concentration, ii. deposit insurance, iii. currency crises, iv. financial openness and 
v. flexibility of exchange rate arrangements.  Table 7 reports the relevant regressions, with 
BC indicators as dependent variables (1-4), and with SBS indicators as dependent variables 
(5 and 6). 
With regard to bank concentration, we find a positive and significant impact of bank 
concentration (hhib) on the probability of a government response. This result is consistent    28  
 
with those obtained in several studies in the literature using SBS-type indicators mentioned 
previously.  However, it conflicts with what has been reported in the literature using BC 
indicators (e.g a negative relationship), and with what we obtained earlier with the country 
level data (e.g. no robust relationship).  Assessing whether these differences are due to 
differences in sample composition or to other factors is left to future research. At the same 
time, we find a positive and significant relationship between bank concentration and the 
probability of a systemic bank shock (SBS) just as we found with the country level data.      
With regard to deposit insurance, the results with bank-level data are somewhat 
different than those obtained with the country sample.  With the individual bank data, the 
probability of a government response to bank distress (BC) is not significantly higher when 
an explicit deposit insurance system is in place. This finding conflicts with all results 
previously reported in the literature.   Similar to what we found with the country sample, an 
explicit deposit insurance system does not have a significant impact on the probability of a 
systemic bank shock (SBS). Again, assessing whether these differences are due to sample 
composition or to other factors is worth investigating further but left for future research.  
The impact of variables related to the external shocks is stronger and slightly different 
from that obtained using country-level data.  First, currency crises appear to have a positive 
and significant impact on both the joint probability that a distressed bank is located in a 
country where a policy (BC) response occurs, as well as on the probability of a bank 
systemic shock (SBS). This is consistent with the previous findings based on country-level 
data, but the significance of coefficients is stronger in all cases.  
Second, financial openness is associated with a lower probability of a distressed bank 
being in a country in which there was a policy response to bank distress, but statistical    29  
 
significance is weak. Importantly, financial openness has no effect on the probability of an 
adverse bank shock (SBS).  
Finally, more flexible exchange rate arrangements are not significantly associated 
associated with the probability that a distressed bank is in a country where a policy response 
occurred. However, more flexible exchange rate arrangements are associated with a lower 
probability of an adverse bank shock (SBS). This evidence supports some of the arguments 
made in the literature about the comparatively stronger resilience to external shocks of 
countries with more flexible exchange rate arrangements.  
All in all, the evidence obtained with this bank-level dataset supports the main finding 
regarding the differences between BC and SBS indicators. It also provides evidence that 
bank-level data may be more informative in assessing the determinants of bank fragility.  
 
VI.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
There are important policy implications here.  As we have documented elsewhere 
(Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), policy-makers have long believed that there exists an 
unfortunate trade-off between competition and stability in banking. However, our previous 
research on that topic (Boyd and De Nicolò 2005, Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal 2009, and De 
Nicolò and Lucchetta, 2009) has challenged the conventional wisdom.  It has also produced a 
substantial new debate on this issue.  One seemingly important piece of evidence in the 
debate has been the empirical finding that more competition leads to a higher probability of 
banking crises.  Results in the current paper suggest that this finding is incorrect and that the 
relationship is actually of opposite sign.  To be sure, this is an on-going debate and more 
work is needed.  But this is an extremely important policy issue.          30  
 
  Previous research has concluded that the presence of deposit insurance worsens moral 
hazard problems and increases the likelihood of banking crises  (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002, and Beck et al. 2006). We find that this is not so, but when deposit 
insurance is present the authorities may be more likely to intervene when the banking system 
suffers an adverse shock. With the BC indicators employed in previous research, the two 
separate effects―crisis occurrence and policy response―are co-mingled and their effects 
appear to have been misinterpreted.   From a policy perspective, therefore, the moral hazard 
problems created by deposit insurance may be smaller than thought or may not even exist.  If 
true, policy makers have less reason to be concerned about this “side effect” of deposit 
insurance.  Again, this topic is important and simply needs more research.     
Lastly, previous research has obtained different results with regard to the impact of 
financial openness and the flexibility of exchange arrangements on bank fragility. Using 
individual bank data, we found that financial openness does not necessarily adversely impact 
banking systems solvency, and that flexibility of exchange rate arrangements may be 
associated with a lower probability of bank insolvency. These results are highly relevant for 
policy and more research is needed as well. Moreover, in some of our specifications, our 
results contrast with results using country-data. This suggests the potential value of 
extracting information from disaggregated data.      
The results of this study suggest two priorities for future research. First, the most 
obvious need is to develop richer theory capable of delivering SBS indicators more refined 
than the simple ones employed in this study.  The main concern is to be sure that candidate 
SBS indicators truly reflect bad shocks to banks and not government responses. In this 
regard, there is no substitute for richer theory guiding measurement. Second, individual bank    31  
 
panel datasets are likely to be more useful than the country panels usually employed.  The 
individual firm data are more informative and allow better measurement of systemic bank 
shocks as well as some determinants of bank fragility.  
In sum, much work remains to be done. We believe the results of a large literature on 
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Table 1. Statistics of BC Indicators 
 
DD: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005); CEA: Caprio et al. (2005); RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b); LV: Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
 
Panel A : Summary Statistics of Classifications of Systemic Banking Crises 
Total  Total  Total  Total crisis   Total crisis   Total   Average
country  country  country  country years  country years  number crisis
years years years as % of total  of systemic duration
excluding excluding country years crises in years
crisis  years crisis  years
after the first after the first
as % of total 
country years
DD 2350 2070 88.1 363 15.4 83 4.4
CEA 2143 1833 85.5 382 17.8 78 4.9
RR 2375 2171 91.4 300 12.6 69 4.3
LV 2275 2021 88.8 339 14.9 84 4.0
Panel B : Pairwise Comparisons
Classifications Total  Number of Number of Total Total Total Total
country years country years country years country years agreed discrepancies discrepancies
in common A = NO crisis A = crisis discrepancies country years as % of common as % of agreed
A B B= crisis B=NO crisis country years crisis
  country years
+ discrepancies
Only first crisis country year
DD CEA 1720 14 20 34 55 2.0 38.2
DD RR 1986 15 30 45 46 2.3 49.5
DD LV 1920 15 21 36 57 1.9 38.7
CEA RR 1777 7 18 25 55 1.4 31.3
CEA LV 1769 10 10 20 67 1.1 23.0
LV RR 1976 22 12 34 55 1.7 38.2
All crisis country years
DD CEA 2118 109 93 202 263 9.5 43.4
DD RR 2187 48 115 163 248 7.5 39.7
DD LV 2090 65 95 160 264 7.7 37.7
CEA RR 1979 41 123 164 259 8.3 38.8
CEA LV 2089 19 65 84 259 4.0 24.5
RR LV 2275 99 60 159 240 7.0 39.8     36  
 
Table 2. Logit Regressions: SBS indicators Predict BC Indicators  
Dependent variables are the BC indicators with all crisis dates: DD, CEA, RR and LVE. All regressions include all available observations for each classification. 
Explanatory variables: rgdpgr is the GDP growth rate; rint is the real interest rate; infl is the percentage change in the GDP deflator; totch is the change in the 
terms of trade; depr is the exchange rate depreciation vs. the US$; m2res is the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves; rgdpcp is real GDP per-capita; 
privcrd_gdp is bank credit to the private sector to GDP; L2.domcredgr is real domestic bank credit growth to the private sector lagged twice. L.SBSL10 and 
L.SBSL25 are lagged SBS lending indicators; L.SBSD10 and L.SBSD25 are lagged SBS deposit indicators. Standard errors are clustered by country. Robust p-
values are reported in brackets, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES DD CEA RR LV DD CEA RR LV
rgdpgr -0.0672*** -0.0869*** -0.0840*** -0.0767*** -0.0674*** -0.0872*** -0.0840*** -0.0771***
[0.000437] [1.90e-05] [3.25e-06] [0.000272] [0.000430] [1.68e-05] [2.34e-06] [0.000249]
rint 0.000177 0.000174 0.000345** 0.000140 0.000151 0.000122 0.000293* 9.83e-05
[0.119] [0.109] [0.0490] [0.202] [0.155] [0.229] [0.0674] [0.340]
infl 0.000161 0.000163 -0.000906 0.000108 0.000130 9.97e-05 -0.000912 5.70e-05
[0.405] [0.289] [0.122] [0.507] [0.477] [0.506] [0.113] [0.720]
totch -0.00102 -0.00169 -0.00179 -0.00257 -0.00104 -0.00150 -0.00201 -0.00259
[0.803] [0.618] [0.673] [0.471] [0.794] [0.638] [0.622] [0.449]
depr 0.341 0.298 0.706* 0.430 0.388 0.393 0.767** 0.508*
[0.273] [0.327] [0.0565] [0.165] [0.197] [0.195] [0.0394] [0.0977]
m2res 0.00204* 0.00114 0.00187** 0.00147 0.00202** 0.00113 0.00187** 0.00144*
[0.0540] [0.220] [0.0464] [0.109] [0.0453] [0.174] [0.0335] [0.0799]
rgdpcp -1.30e-05 -1.74e-05 -1.49e-05 -2.12e-05 -1.40e-05 -1.95e-05 -1.79e-05 -2.32e-05
[0.529] [0.573] [0.640] [0.323] [0.499] [0.533] [0.580] [0.287]
privcrd_gdp 0.00113*** -0.164 -0.0884 -0.129 0.00111*** -0.179 -0.0991 -0.138
[0.000497] [0.239] [0.414] [0.269] [0.000759] [0.242] [0.402] [0.271]
L2.rdomcredgr 0.00218 -0.00209 -0.00274 -0.00130 0.00261 -0.00143 -0.00254 -0.000574
[0.560] [0.502] [0.413] [0.733] [0.496] [0.654] [0.451] [0.881]
L.SBSL10 0.365** 0.785*** 0.771*** 0.664***
[0.0469] [2.72e-05] [2.61e-05] [0.000482]
L.SBSD10 0.212 0.340* 0.182 0.336*
[0.343] [0.0922] [0.482] [0.0971]
Constant -1.402*** -1.104*** -1.603*** -1.306*** -1.381*** -1.035*** -1.505*** -1.252***
[0] [8.47e-07] [0] [0] [0] [3.55e-06] [0] [2.40e-10]
Observations 1707 1529 1707 1633 1707 1529 1707 1633
# of countries 91 81 91 87 91 81 91 87
Pseudo-R2 0.0420 0.0825 0.0802 0.0807 0.0405 0.0734 0.0704 0.0746
L.SBSL25 0.412*** 0.576*** 0.519*** 0.448***
[0.00388] [0.000126] [0.000126] [0.00541]
L.SBSD25 0.152 0.143 0.0542 0.127
[0.415] [0.425] [0.763] [0.487]
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Table 3. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators and Bank Concentration  
Dependent variables are the BC indicators with all crisis dates: DD, CE 
A, RR and LV. All regressions are full sample regressions including all available observations for each classification.  Explanatory variables: rgdpgr is the GDP 
growth rate; rint is the real interest rate; infl is the percentage change in the GDP deflator; totch is the change in the terms of trade; depr is the exchange rate 
depreciation vs. the US$; m2res is the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves; rgdpcp is real GDP per-capita; privcrd_gdp is bank credit to the private sector to 
GDP; L2.domcredgr is real domestic bank credit growth to the private sector lagged twice; avgherf is the average Herfindhal index. Standard errors are clustered 
by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES DD CEA RR LV SBSL25 SBSL10 SBSD25 SBSD10
rgdpgr -0.0850*** -0.109*** -0.0954*** -0.105*** -0.120*** -0.109*** 0.0545*** 0.0355
[0.000134] [2.92e-06] [6.34e-05] [8.00e-06] [1.31e-05] [0.000916] [0.00172] [0.131]
rint 0.00501 0.00503 0.00490 0.00167 -0.00921* -0.00670* -0.00103 -0.00299
[0.160] [0.367] [0.166] [0.596] [0.0692] [0.0513] [0.726] [0.112]
infl 0.00527 0.00518 0.00338 0.00210 -0.00180 -0.00663** -0.00235 -0.00461**
[0.161] [0.343] [0.260] [0.524] [0.790] [0.0348] [0.386] [0.0279]
totch 0.00254 4.05e-05 -0.000178 0.000225 0.0181*** 0.0136** 0.0158* 0.0268***
[0.575] [0.992] [0.969] [0.955] [0.00142] [0.0260] [0.0935] [0.00756]
depr 0.534 0.740 0.807 0.583 2.446*** 3.305*** 1.633*** 2.576***
[0.319] [0.199] [0.159] [0.280] [0.000275] [6.14e-08] [0.000618] [8.84e-07]
m2res 0.00188* 0.000912 0.00182** 0.00103 0.00181** -0.000329 0.00165*** 0.00168
[0.0682] [0.250] [0.0302] [0.220] [0.0257] [0.668] [0.00924] [0.137]
rgdpcp -2.12e-05 -9.21e-06 -3.80e-05 -4.09e-05 -1.81e-05 5.03e-05** -1.42e-05 -5.68e-05***
[0.362] [0.779] [0.352] [0.129] [0.222] [0.0392] [0.269] [0.00770]
privcrd_gdp 0.00117*** -0.180 -0.0871 -0.131 -0.000645** -5.794*** 0.000835*** -0.00125
[0.00123] [0.297] [0.511] [0.418] [0.0238] [1.01e-05] [6.19e-05] [0.276]
L2.rdomcredgr 0.00287 -0.00165 -0.00224 -0.00187 -0.0134** 0.00231 -0.0142*** -0.00600
[0.583] [0.728] [0.657] [0.734] [0.0114] [0.646] [0.00755] [0.314]
avgherf -0.118 1.114 -0.375 0.255 1.460*** 1.562*** 0.866** 1.587***
[0.848] [0.221] [0.635] [0.767] [4.75e-05] [0.00135] [0.0250] [0.00121]
Constant -1.335*** -1.605*** -1.433*** -1.180*** -1.539*** -1.936*** -1.705*** -3.120***
[1.03e-05] [0.000747] [0.000790] [0.00282] [0] [1.05e-05] [0] [0]
Observations 1205 1057 1205 1143 1205 1205 1205 1205
# of countries 79 69 79 75 79 79 79 79
Pseudo-R2 0.0600 0.120 0.0986 0.112 0.178 0.313 0.0672 0.157  
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Table 4. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators and Deposit Insurance 
Dependent variables are: the BC indicators with all crisis dates (DD, CEA, RR and LV); the SBS lending indicators,  SBL25 and .SBSL10, and the SBS deposit 
indicators, SBSD25 and SBSD10.  Explanatory variables: rgdpgr is the GDP growth rate; rint is the real interest rate; infl is the percentage change in the GDP 
deflator; totch is the change in the terms of trade; depr is the exchange rate depreciation vs. the US$; m2res is the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves; 
rgdpcp is real GDP per-capita; privcrd_gdp is bank credit to the private sector to GDP; L2.domcredgr is real domestic bank credit growth to the private sector 
lagged twice; avgherf is the average Herfindhal index; di is the binary indicator of deposit insurance. Standard errors are clustered by country. Robust p-values 
are reported in brackets, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES DD CEA RR LV SBSL25 SBSL10 SBSD25 SBSD10
rgdpgr -0.0871*** -0.118*** -0.0980*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.110*** 0.0546*** 0.0360
[0.000148] [2.76e-06] [5.69e-05] [9.05e-06] [1.56e-05] [0.00107] [0.00169] [0.134]
rint 0.00546 0.00597 0.00537 0.00223 -0.00936* -0.00662* -0.000987 -0.00277
[0.128] [0.256] [0.129] [0.458] [0.0679] [0.0572] [0.739] [0.154]
infl 0.00568 0.00601 0.00374 0.00254 -0.00165 -0.00665** -0.00231 -0.00440**
[0.132] [0.250] [0.210] [0.420] [0.811] [0.0276] [0.395] [0.0408]
totch 0.00219 -0.000736 -0.000612 -0.000527 0.0182*** 0.0133** 0.0158* 0.0264***
[0.624] [0.867] [0.895] [0.897] [0.00144] [0.0291] [0.0938] [0.00697]
depr 0.523 0.762 0.801 0.596 2.434*** 3.327*** 1.631*** 2.603***
[0.338] [0.223] [0.177] [0.294] [0.000319] [4.63e-08] [0.000587] [1.16e-06]
m2res 0.00197* 0.00116 0.00191** 0.00123 0.00179** -0.000283 0.00167*** 0.00179
[0.0554] [0.125] [0.0212] [0.123] [0.0271] [0.712] [0.00880] [0.110]
rgdpcp -3.06e-05 -2.52e-05 -4.51e-05 -5.63e-05** -1.63e-05 4.67e-05** -1.55e-05 -6.43e-05***
[0.172] [0.438] [0.278] [0.0411] [0.300] [0.0469] [0.285] [0.00253]
privcrd_gdp 0.00114*** -0.219 -0.102 -0.157 -0.000647** -5.741*** 0.000831*** -0.00119
[0.00127] [0.195] [0.465] [0.332] [0.0229] [1.75e-05] [4.96e-05] [0.290]
L2.rdomcredgr 0.00295 -0.000858 -0.00196 -0.00145 -0.0134** 0.00242 -0.0142*** -0.00556
[0.568] [0.855] [0.687] [0.791] [0.0114] [0.628] [0.00785] [0.342]
avgherf 0.189 1.898** -0.0661 0.878 1.416*** 1.731*** 0.904** 1.893***
[0.766] [0.0298] [0.933] [0.299] [0.000249] [0.000589] [0.0273] [3.49e-05]
di 0.568* 1.325*** 0.549 1.099*** -0.101 0.334 0.0775 0.584
[0.0719] [0.00185] [0.203] [0.00432] [0.685] [0.275] [0.789] [0.164]
Constant -1.552*** -2.188*** -1.651*** -1.636*** -1.509*** -2.079*** -1.732*** -3.364***
[4.84e-06] [1.65e-06] [9.59e-05] [3.01e-05] [0] [8.52e-06] [0] [0]
Observations 1205 1057 1205 1143 1205 1205 1205 1205
# of countries 79 69 79 75 79 79 79 79
Pseudo-R2 0.0668 0.152 0.104 0.136 0.178 0.314 0.0673 0.162     39  
 
 
Table 5. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators and Currency Crises 
Dependent variables are the BC indicators with all crisis dates: DD, CEA, RR and LV. Explanatory variables: rgdpgr is the GDP growth rate; rint is the real 
interest rate; infl is the percentage change in the GDP deflator; rgdpcp is real GDP per-capita; privcrd_gdp is bank credit to the private sector to GDP; avgherf is 
the average Herfindhal index.; di is the binary indicator of deposit insurance ; crisis 25 is the indicator of currency crisis; finopen is financial openness; erclassrr 
is the index of flexibility of exchange rate arrangements Standard errors are clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets, with *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES DD CEA RR LV SBSL25 SBSL10 SBSD25 SBSD10
L.rgdpgr -0.088*** -0.134*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.112*** -0.065*** -0.078**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.027]
L.rint 0.005* 0.005 0.006* 0.005 0.008** 0.009*** 0.002 0.000
[0.079] [0.203] [0.065] [0.118] [0.039] [0.000] [0.584] [0.800]
L.infl 0.005* 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.000
[0.084] [0.223] [0.201] [0.136] [0.000] [0.000] [0.734] [0.983]
L.rgdpcp -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
[0.319] [0.583] [0.504] [0.058] [0.233] [0.789] [0.123] [0.000]
L.privcrd_gdp 0.001*** -0.251 -0.128 -0.155 -0.000 -2.528*** 0.001*** -0.000
[0.003] [0.144] [0.391] [0.350] [0.863] [0.003] [0.000] [0.909]
L2.rdomcredgr 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.012** -0.001 -0.018** -0.009
[0.389] [0.990] [0.774] [0.714] [0.031] [0.836] [0.016] [0.137]
avgherf 0.511 2.491** 0.246 0.895 2.074*** 1.733*** 1.541*** 2.878***
[0.487] [0.020] [0.783] [0.413] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
di 0.428 1.502*** 0.559 1.251*** 0.069 0.313 -0.097 0.221
[0.241] [0.003] [0.268] [0.007] [0.788] [0.283] [0.732] [0.614]
L.crisis25 0.299 0.532** 0.441* 0.449* 1.061*** 0.734*** 0.193 0.526*
[0.242] [0.046] [0.094] [0.065] [0.000] [0.008] [0.340] [0.054]
L.finopen -0.501* -0.348 -0.527 -0.458 0.046 0.253*** 0.129 0.357***
[0.097] [0.329] [0.144] [0.163] [0.519] [0.002] [0.281] [0.003]
L.erclassrr 0.014 0.014 -0.037 -0.034 0.000 0.018 0.044* 0.093***
[0.720] [0.775] [0.472] [0.408] [0.988] [0.482] [0.070] [0.002]
Constant -1.127** -2.026** -0.740 -0.897 -2.015*** -2.884*** -1.782*** -4.225***
[0.046] [0.014] [0.255] [0.158] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 935 823 935 903 935 935 935 935
# of countries 61 54 61 59 61 61 61 61
Pseudo-R2 0.0788 0.186 0.129 0.171 0.195 0.223 0.0835 0.192     40  
 
 
Table 6. Evidence from bank-level data: SBS Indicators Predict BC Indicators   
Dependent variables are the BC indicators  DD(x), CEA(x), RR(x) and LV(x) interacted with the proxy measures of bank failure probabilities at the fifth 
percentile (x=5) and the 10
th percentile (x=10). All explanatory variables are lagged one year (prefix L.): growth is the GDP growth rate; infl is CPI inflation;  
gdppc is real GDP per capita; lasset is banks’ log of total assets. FAIL5 and FAIL10 are two proxy measures of bank failures according to the overall distribution 
of the sum of profits and equity capital standardized by assets, corresponding to the 5
th and 10
th percentile of the entire distribution of this sum across time and 
countries. The statistical model is a random effect logit model, with standard errors clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets, with *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES DD5  DD10  CEA5  CEA10 RR5  RR10  LV5 LV10 
                          
L.growth  -0.074*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.045*** -0.086*** -0.053*** -0.071***  -0.048*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
L.infl 0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
[0.432] [0.773] [0.548] [0.966] [0.533] [0.997] [0.449]  [0.898] 
L.gdppc  0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0002***  0.0004***  0.0003*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
L.lasset  0.396*** 0.499*** 0.411*** 0.521*** 0.428*** 0.521***  0.398***  0.505*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
L.FAIL5 1.476***  1.307***  1.275***  1.456*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
L.FAIL10 1.370***  1.299***  1.303***  1.348*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Constant  -10.263*** -11.883*** -10.480*** -12.151*** -11.333*** -12.887***  -10.444***  -12.198*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Observations  13828 13828 13475 13475 13828 13828 13774  13774 
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Table 7. Evidence from bank-level data: Determinants of BC and SBS Indicators 
Dependent variables are the BC indicators DD5, CEA5, RR5 and LV5 described in table 6, and the two SBS indicators that proxy measures of bank failures 
according to the overall distribution of the sum of profits and equity capital standardized by assets, corresponding to the 5
th and 10
th percentile of the entire 
distribution of this sum across time and countries, called FAIL5 and FAIL10 respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged one year (prefix L.): growth is the 
GDP growth rate; infl is CPI inflation; gdppc is real GDP per capita; lasset is banks’ log of total assets; crisis 25 is the indicator of currency crisis; finopen is 
financial openness; erclassrr is the index of flexibility of exchange rate arrangements.  The statistical model is a random effect logit model, with standard errors 
clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
                                                                                                 BC Indicators                                                                                       SBS Indicators 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES DD5 CEA5 RR5 LV5 FAIL5 FAIL10
L.growth -0.101*** -0.090*** -0.103*** -0.089*** -0.042*** -0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.783]
L.infl 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.218] [0.196] [0.196] [0.181] [0.324] [0.683]
L.gdppc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [0.241]
L.lasset 0.542*** 0.548*** 0.596*** 0.529*** 0.520*** 0.682***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
L.hhib 2.420*** 2.287*** 2.021** 2.452*** 2.415*** 2.300***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.022] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
L.di -0.012 -0.018 -0.233 0.041 0.142 0.269
[0.962] [0.944] [0.378] [0.871] [0.455] [0.116]
L.crisis25 0.455** 0.618*** 0.613*** 0.537** 0.523*** 0.451***
[0.032] [0.003] [0.006] [0.012] [0.002] [0.003]
L.finopen -0.440** -0.252 -0.271 -0.380* 0.059 0.101
[0.027] [0.171] [0.169] [0.056] [0.600] [0.340]
L.erclassrr -0.023 -0.023 -0.037 -0.022 -0.058*** -0.047**
[0.363] [0.368] [0.180] [0.392] [0.005] [0.015]
Constant -12.675*** -13.072*** -13.919*** -12.860*** -11.705*** -13.202***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 8630 8494 8630 8630 8630 8630
Number of banks 1855 1821 1855 1855 1855 1855  CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
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